The history of legal aid, as told by a witness
By Joseph R. Grodin
Former Supreme Court justice
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Grodin |
There’s a memorable New Yorker cartoon in which a lawyer,
confronting a prospective client in his office, smartly declares: “The good
news, Mrs. Jones, is that you have an excellent case. The bad news is you can’t
afford me.”
I don’t know why that was supposed to be funny. On
reflection, it seems terribly sad. I remember it because I had many experiences
like that as a lawyer myself. The existence of a “justice gap,” as it is
sometimes called, the gap between what effective legal services cost and what
people of modest means can afford, is well-known to lawyers and policymakers.
It is a gap made progressively larger by increasing disparities in the
distribution of wealth. And it is a problem not just for those who need legal
services and can’t afford them. It is a problem for all of society. The
existence (and perception) of an effective and equitable system for resolving
controversies is essential to social cohesion. By denying access to that system
to large groups of people, we invite distrust, alienation and breakdown of the
institutions that are designed to hold us together.
This much is generally understood and accepted by
thoughtful citizens, at least when they turn their attention to the problem.
What is not part of that consensus is what to do about it. In recent years, bar
associations, law schools, legislatures, courts and advocacy groups around the
country have expressed concern and advanced a variety of remedies. Generally,
their proposals fall into two categories: finding ways of making lawyers
available to poor people, or finding ways of making justice available without
lawyers.
The first category includes such policies as increasing
public or private funding for lawyers through legal aid systems or through
establishment of a constitutional right of access to lawyers in certain types
of cases (“civil Gideon”); or by lawyers volunteering (or being required) to
perform some legal services on a pro bono basis; or by changes in procedures
that would make courts and administrative agencies more efficient and therefore
less costly; or by devising ways for lawyers to assist those in need by assuming
responsibility for a defined portion of the client’s legal needs
(“unbundling”).
The second category aims to facilitate people representing
themselves (“self-help”) or being represented by people who are not certified
lawyers but who have adequate training and experience in certain types of
proceedings such as to make their representation meaningful and effective.
While the two approaches are by no means mutually exclusive, political
realities tend to push advocates into one camp or the other.
Earl Johnson Jr., a former legal aid attorney and
advocate, former law professor and retired justice of the California Court of
Appeal, has brought a lifetime of experience and thought to the problem of the
justice gap through a three-volume work published by Praeger: “To
Establish Justice for All: The Past and Future of Civil Legal Aid in the United
States.” Carefully researched and beautifully written, the book tells the
story of civil legal aid, from its earliest days in the last quarter of the 19th
century through the current era. In it we learn of the period, which lasted
until 1964, in which legal aid was seen as a charity, funded through private
donations, mainly by lawyers and law firms. Johnson describes the development
of the Office of Economic Opportunity legal services program and the political
battles that ensued, the creation of the Legal Services Corp. and President Ronald
Reagan’s attempts at obstructing it. Johnson also details more recent events,
including President Bill Clinton’s attempts to expand legal services and the
pushback by Newt Gingrich, resulting in a substantial narrowing of access to
justice for the nation’s poor.
But the book is more than a history. As Johnson states in
the prologue, it is “10 percent memoir,” and that extra percentage is what
makes the book particularly lively and timely. Johnson was a participant in the
developments he describes over the last half-century. He began his legal career
as a poverty lawyer in Washington, D.C., served as deputy director and then
director of the OEO legal services program, and contributed to the drafting of
the legislation that created the Legal Services Corporation.
So it is not surprising that, as Johnson acknowledges, it
is “history with a point of view.” His point of view starts with the
recognition that history reflects “a contest of two visions of what poor people
deserve in the way of legal aid” – whether, by analogy to health care, they
should be afforded the equivalent of a “network of first aid stations” or
whether they should be entitled to a broader range of services, equivalent to
the availability of specialists and hospitals, including, in the legal context,
services aimed at “law reform,” through “impact work” and “high quality legal
services.” Johnson strongly supports the broader vision, and implicitly, a
preference for an approach to solving the justice gap by increasing the
availability of lawyers through public funding.
Johnson’s preference is for a “rights-based” system that
exists in some European countries, which guarantees legal services to
financially eligible people with meritorious and significant claims or defenses
through government or private lawyers. He would prefer that this be done
through recognition of a broad constitutional right to counsel in civil cases.
But Johnson is also a realist. He recognizes that public
funding for lawyers faces formidable political obstacles, and in the last
chapter of the book he considers lower cost alternatives “that might provide
effective access to justice in selected situations,” including self-help, lay
advocates in administrative proceedings and perhaps simple court cases and
technology that delivers legal services to those unable to afford counsel. He
is skeptical of each of these as a substitute for legal assistance. For
example, he warns that the need to accommodate pro per litigants in courts may
push this country’s adversarial system in the direction of an inquisitorial
system, and that the use of lay advocates may create an imbalance unless the
other party is required also to use a non-lawyer. But he addresses these and
other alternatives in an open-minded manner.
It does not seem likely that the justice gap can be
filled with lawyers any time soon, while support of other alternatives runs the
risk of providing an excuse to those unwilling to try. In the end, it seems
likely that both approaches will be necessary, but we still have a great deal
to learn from other countries, from experimentation and from empirical studies
which so far have been mostly lacking. For anyone interested in a road map of
where we have been and where we might be going, however, Justice Johnson’s book
is an excellent start.
Joseph R. Grodin, a former justice of the California
Supreme Court is a distinguished emeritus professor at the University of
California Hastings College of the Law. The book author, Earl Johnson Jr.
serves on the State Bar’s Civil
Justice Strategies Task Force, which is exploring ways to fill the
justice gap.